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Participatory budgeting in Australian local government: An initial 
assessment and critical issues 
Abstract: Participatory budgeting (PB), a process whereby governments seek direct input 
from citizens into financial decisions, is gaining a foothold in the community engagement 
practices of Australian local governments. Following questions of definition, we survey the 
theoretical terrain, locating PB within several components of local democracy. We then 
provide details of six PB processes in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. We 
identify several questions for the future of PB in Australian local governments, including the 
role of deliberative practices as part of the broader work of councils; the issue of the 
adaptability of councils and leaders; the impacts upon state and local governments and the 
role of third parties. The article concludes by reflecting on how PB sits with democratic 
practices at the local level if it continues to be implemented. 
 
Keywords: Community engagement; democracy; deliberation; local government finance; 
participatory budgeting; participatory governance; representation; tokenism 
 
Introduction 
In 2014 the City of Melbourne led a participatory budgeting (PB) process to determine how 
the city’s $5 billion budget should be allocated over the next 10 years. The process was 
conducted over a period of five months and cost $185,000 (Clear Horizon Consulting 2015). 
It comprised two approaches: broad engagement of the community through a variety of 
outreach and traditional engagement methods, including online budget allocators and 
workshops; and the random selection of a representative panel that was led through a 
deliberative process to determine the long term financial plan for the city. The outcome of the 




recommendations, nine have been incorporated into the financial plan, one has been 
interpreted as a directive for Council to take an advocacy role and one recommendation could 
not be adopted as it contradicted the newly introduced state government rate capping policy 
(City of Melbourne 2014: 39)1. 
The Melbourne process, while salient, was not the first of its kind in Australia. In 2012 
the municipality of Canada Bay in Sydney’s inner west undertook what is widely regarded as 
the first PB process in Australian local government (see, for example, Thompson 2012). It 
convened a representative deliberative group of community members to make 
recommendations for the services budget of the Council over four years (Canada Bay 
Citizens’ Panel 2012). In 2013 and 2014, the City of Greater Geraldton, located 400 
kilometres to the north of Perth, conducted two PB processes: one for its 10-year capital 
works budget and a subsequent process for its annual services budget (City of Greater 
Geraldton 2013; 2014). Both these processes featured randomly selected deliberative panels 
and were tasked with making a recommendation to council for the allocation of long-term 
budgets; with the first representing 100 per cent of council’s capital outlays over the 10-year 
period. 
Australian local government practice is dotted with other, albeit smaller examples of 
PB, such as City of Darebin’s 2014 Citizen’s Jury, initiated to make recommendations to 
council to determine the allocation of a proportion of its capital works budget over a two year 
period (City of Darebin, 2014) and the City of Melville’s ‘Project Robin Hood’ undertaken in 
2013, which saw the council’s annual community grants allocated by community members 
through online voting rather than deliberative methods such as citizen’s juries and world 
cafes used elsewhere (City of Melville 2015; for a synoptic comparison see Table 1). 
With these six processes in three years, as well as others commencing (Penrith City 




emerging practice in the community engagement toolkits of Australian local governments, 
(see, for example, Grant et al. 2012; Hartz-Karp 2012). However, the marked increase of PB 
globally suggests that it might constitute a major shift in local government practices and one 
that Australia is quite late in adopting. For instance, the most recent attempts to estimate the 
number of PB projects globally identified between 1, 269 and 2, 778 such processes in 2012 
(Sintomer et al. 2013). Notwithstanding the difficulty in recording the actions of local 
governments across the globe, the actual number may be much higher. 
The incidence of the practice globally, alongside recent Australian examples hint at 
how PB is being broadly interpreted and the social and political contexts it is practiced in. 
While some have suggested the practices are too heterogeneous to make a definition possible 
(Ganuza et al. 2014; Marquetti et al. 2012) others have argued that to avoid a definition or a 
basic set of criteria  renders it impossible to classify and evaluate the practices (Traub-Merz 
et al. 2013: 2). This paper seeks to broadly define PB ifor the purposes of understanding how 
it is being interpreted in the Australian context. Our central concern is to explore emerging 
PB practices in Australian local governments with a view to identifying critical issues for its 
continued use, alongside interpreting it as an element of administrative and political reforms. 
To this end we examine six specific questions, namely: what role deliberative practices play 
as an element of PB; what the likely longevity and institutional thickness of PB in Australian 
local government; how organisations (local and state government) adapt for PB; the impact of 
PB on the roles and responsibilities of local and state government; the optimal role of actors 
in PB processes and how the design of PBs in the Australian context is constitutive of and 
affects practices of local democracy. 
The paper itself is divided into three main parts. Initially we survey different 
understandings of PB and where these sit in the wider context of participatory democratic 




and co-production. We then examine the experiences of Australian local governments that 
have conducted PB processes. We then suggest a series of questions in response to the 
emergence of PB in the Australian context and identify the challenges that we suggest require 
consideration for the future of PB in the Australian context. The paper concludes with a 
reflection on the democratic values of effective governance, issues of legitimacy and justice 
(Fung 2006) and how Australian PB practice may respond if it continues to develop. 
What is participatory budgeting? 
At its most simple, PB can be defined as a ‘process through which citizens can contribute to 
decision-making over at least part of the governmental budget’ (Goldfrank 2007a: 92). This 
definition encompasses all variations in practice, although it is considerably broader than the 
definition used in what is widely regarded to be the first PB process in Porto Alegre, Brazil 
(see, for example, Baiocchi 2001; Pateman 2012; Santos 1998). In the Brazilian context PB 
was defined as ‘a structure and a process of community participation based on three major 
principles’, namely: that participation is open to all; that the process is guided by both direct 
and representative democratic rules; and that it uses both general and technical criteria to 
determine resource allocation (Santos 1998: 468). Goldfrank (2007: 92) has suggested that 
since this time subsequent definitions have de-emphasised the structure, loosely interpreted 
the process and identified new and different principles as the underpinning normative and 
operational requirements for the operation of PB. 
Notwithstanding attempts at definition, it could be argued that given the continuing 
variation in practice globally, these attempts have not been particularly successful. They do, 
however, provide a useful starting point in ascertaining what the process typically consists of. 
Santos (1998) initially identified four key principles: [i] participation open to all; [ii] direct 
democratic rules; [iii] integration with representative democratic rules; and, [iv] resource 




Shah (2007) and Goldfrank (2007a) retain direct participation and redistribution and add a 
principle of transparency; however, they dispense with the principles of participation being 
open to all and with the component they label ‘representative democracy’. Wampler (2012) 
built on Shah (2007) and Goldfrank (2007a) adding deliberation.  
Similarly, one of the most widely cited set of criteria as to what a participatory budget 
features was provided by Sintomer et al. (2008). This lists six key features: [i] participation 
by non-elected citizens; [ii] discussion of the budget; [iii] involvement of the municipal level 
of government; [iv] a repeated process with more than one meeting; [v] that some form of 
public deliberation is included; and [vi] that some accountability over the outcomes is part of 
the process. As we suggest (below) when we examine PB globally these criteria imply that 
what is ‘branded’ as PB may not be PB according to the commonly accepted set of key 
features. Arguably, the variation in these principles is reflective of the practice, where 
processes of representative democracy and participation open to all have made way for more 
deliberative practices. Debate at the conceptual level also indicates the normative dimensions 
of questions of definition within practices of local democracy across a plurality of settings. 
Nevertheless, declaring that PB necessarily entails foundational concepts such as 
‘representative democracy’ and ‘participation’ and, in the case of Fung (2006) and Wampler 
(2012) ‘social justice’ begs questions concerning what these authors mean in their use of 
these terms. It is to these questions that we now turn.  
Context: Theory and practice of participatory budgeting  
In order to place PB in a context and engage with the broader literature and local government 
practice – particularly democratic practices in local government – we derive Figure 1 from 





























Source: Adapted from Haus and Sweeting (2006) and Grant et al. (2014: 7–8). 
 
Examining Figure 1, it represents the practices of local democracy (at centre) comprised of 
four principal types – or what Haus and Sweeting (2006: 267) refer to as ‘non-exclusive 
components’, namely ‘representative’ (at left) participatory’ (at right) ‘user-pays’ (bottom) 
and ‘network’ (top). For their part, Haus and Sweeting (2006: 267) offer a concise definition 
of democracy: 
 
We take democracy as the idea to promote a common good under circumstances 
where there is no strong pre-existing agreement on what this common good is, what 
it entails and how it can be promoted – with the significant qualification that this 
promotion is not imposed on society by force or manipulation, but is subject to 
public justification ... Democracy is thus intimately linked with the question of what 
is ‘good’ for the members of a political community, and considering local democracy 
Network 
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implies that local government, like governments at upper levels, has a process of 
collective self-determination as its normative core. 
 
While it may seem trite to offer up such a cursory definition of a concept that has been 
profoundly reflected upon, this definition highlights both the contestable nature of the 
common good and that collective determination is the ‘normative core’ of democracy – i.e.: it 
acknowledges the importance of both outcomes and the value of processes (see Dollery and 
Grant 2010: 9). This is particularly important in discussions of PB. 
Haus and Sweeting (2006) engage in a sustained discussion of each of their ‘non-exclusive 
components’ of local democracy. For our purposes they can be concisely defined. First, for 
‘representative’ democracy (at left) they cite Sharpe’s (1970: 168) assertion that ‘”some form 
of election seems essential”’ for decision-making by representatives of the electorate. Within 
this component, they point to representation in the form of strong personal leadership; 
‘parliamentarisation’ at the local level (which historically has not been a salient feature of 
local government in Australia – see Power et al., 1981: 105; Halligan and Paris 1984: 62) and 
a tendency to value decentralisation within discussions of local democracy (Haus and 
Sweeting 2006: 273-275; Shah and Shah 2006). Second, ‘user-democracy’, which 
‘recommends a marketisation of political relationships’ and is specifically utilitarian in that it 
involves ‘measuring (but not evaluating) individual preferences’ where votes are directly 
analogous to money and government responds to supply and demand in a context 
characterised by competition. Third, ‘network’ democracy, characterised by cross-
jurisdictional activities by highly mobile and decisive leaders who nevertheless remain 
accountable on the basis of their visibility (and, we would add) their dispensability (Haus and 
Sweeting 2006: 281-283; see also Grant et al. 2014; Stoker 2003; 2006; 2011). Fourth, 




best about the common good’ and as such ought to be placed to contribute to decision-
making.  
Four our purposes this broad definition of participatory democracy includes conceptions of 
democratic practice that emphasise either participation generally (see, for example, Fung 
2006; Fung and Wright 2003; Pateman 2012) and devolution of authority to the lowest 
possible level as an element of participation (Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003: 176) 
alongside deliberation defined against the mere aggregation of preferences (Ansell and Gash 
2008: 543) and the intrinsic rewards of deliberative processes (Dryzek 1990; Hartz-Karp 
2012; Morrell 2010; Smith 2012; van Aaken et al. 2004). It also includes the concept of 
collaborative or community governance, which recognises the legitimacy of decision-making 
outside traditional sites of local government (Aulich 2009: 45) and co-production, which 
Alford and Yates (2016, p. 159) concisely define as ‘the contribution and effort to the 
delivery of public services by service users and citizens, promoted by or in concert with 
public sector organisations’ (see also Voorberg et al. 2015). PB as we have defined it above 
can also be placed here. 
Figure 1 achieves two broad aims. First, it locates PB as an element of the four 
principal components of local democracy. However, there is an important qualification in that 
the four types are both ‘non-exclusive’ and are identifiable in the literature as cooperating 
and competing elements of local democratic practices. For instance, it is frequently claimed 
that PB involves some type of representation (e.g.: by a randomly selected/generated sample 
of citizens) with the implication that as a process it leads decision-making in a form that is 
additional to (Fung 2006, p. 66) or indeed superior in type to decision-making through 
electoral processes (see, for example, Tormey 2015: 59-82). 
Second (and notwithstanding the claims to the contrary (see Fung 2006: 66)) 




defined against representative electoral processes. Drawing on the work of Barber (1984), 
Fishkin (1991) and Pateman (1970) Haus and Sweeting (2006: 278) assert that for this 
component of local democracy ‘[s]ome form of representation may be a necessary evil… 
[b]ut citizen participation must be granted whenever it is demanded (emphasis added). This 
concisely reflects the deliberative turn generally and in local democracy in particular in the 
context of a ‘democratic deficit’ (Norris 2011). There is a substantive body of theoretical 
work that explores and advocates deliberation as a superior form of decision-making on both 
instrumental and ethical grounds (see, for example, Dryzek 1990; Morrell 2010; Smith 2011) 
and that, as Fung (2006: 68) notes, echoes the work of Habermas (1984; 1989). Nor is this 
view limited to local democracy (see Goodin 2008). This work has been accompanied by a 
sustained critique of representation at both philosophical (see, for example, Rorty 1991: 1) 
and theoretical levels (see Saward 2010; Tanasescu 2014; Tormey 2015). We ought to 
recognise as well that there is a certain type of historicism in some these latter arguments. 
Thus, for example, Tormey (2015: 59) asserts that: ‘Representation is … a discourse 
associated with modernity and the creation of nation states’. Otherwise stated, representation 
is regarded as passé.  
Figure 1 also achieves two tasks specific to the ‘participatory’ quadrant. First, it 
recognises the conflict therein. Thus, for example, Pateman (2012: 8) states inter alia that 
‘[t]he current fashion for deliberative democracy began with political theory’ and that ‘the 
prevalent view, albeit not always made explicit, seems to be that deliberative democracy has 
now overtaken and subsumed its predecessor’ (emphasis added; see also Fung and Wright 
2003). Pateman (2012) takes issue with this presumed ascendency of deliberative over 
participatory democracy, although it is worth noting that some view the two as 
complimentary (see, for example, Thompson 20012; Haus and Sweeting 2006). Nevertheless 




participatory democracy and deliberative democracy theorists are incorporating the language 
of collaborative governance into their theory and practice (see for example Nabatchi and 
O’Leary 2005, Nabatchi 2010, Newman et al 2004, Emerson et al 2012). 
Second, Figure 1 demonstrates that despite the plurality of types and the conflict 
therein, PB is valued across the types – indeed some individual types lay claim to PB. For her 
part, Pateman (2012: 10-11) criticises deliberative democracy for being overly concerned 
with process and juxtaposes this with the more outcome-orientated participatory processes, 
pointing to the PB process in Porto Alegre as exemplary in this regard. Alternatively, from 
the deliberative perspective Hartz-Karp (2012: 2) argues: ‘Participatory budgeting is a 
powerful tool for achieving more effective democracy, particularly so if it is more 
intentionally deliberative than usually practiced (emphasis added). Arguably, PB is conforms 
to definitions of both participatory governance and co-production. 
Also noteworthy is that the theorisation across both participatory and deliberative 
types reaches a further level of detail when directly concerned with the implementation and 
normative defensibility of particular projects. For instance, Fung’s (2006; 2015) ‘democracy 
cube’ discerns three variables in the design of public engagement: (1) who participates; (2) 
how participants communicate with each other and make decisions; and (3) how decisions of 
the deliberation are linked with policy or action. Fung (2006) presents each of these three 
variables as a spectrum and posits different engagement mechanisms, or strategies, along the 
three variables. This is used as a basis to explore the democratic values of legitimacy, 
effective governance and justice in the context of specific projects (see also Emerson et al. 
2012; Sinotmer et al. 2013). 
Turning to the practice of PB, in this context it is possible to make four general 
observations with respect to PB globally and in Australia. First, whereas PB has been 




example, Shah 2007) arguably it has been championed as the way for local government to 
engage with disaffected and apathetic communities and deal with the wicked problem of how 
to manage municipal budgets that are experiencing austerity pressures in established Western 
democracies (see, for example, Lerner and Secondo 2012; Pinnington et al. 2009; Sintomer et 
al. 2013; Traub-Merz et al. 2013). Second, as demonstrated by Table 1 and the examination 
of case studies of PB in the Australian local government context below, compared with other 
parts of the world, Australian local governments have been late adopters of PB, with the first 
documented process occurring in 2012.  
Third, to date Australian practices closely resemble those in Europe, presumably due to 
commonalities such as being established democracies looking to rebuild trust in response to 
claims about a ‘democratic deficit’ (see, for example, Chambers 2003; Hindess 2002; Norris 
2011). Fourth – and we will assert, rather than argue this point in this context – PB practices 
in Australia are still being shaped and administrators are grappling with the principles it 
prioritises over others or what it chooses to adopt and what it chooses to adapt. 
Participatory Budgeting in Australia 
We now examine six PB processes completed by Australian local governments. By outlining 
the key features and significance of each of the processes, we can see how the practice is 
being implemented, from which we abstract and posit several critical observations and 














Budget area $s available for PB vs total 
budget area spend 
Broad methods Deliberative random 
selection methods 




Canada Bay 2012 
Citizens’ Panel (4) 
Services/Operating 
(all) 
Amount not stipulated as part of 
the process (total 
services/operating budget in 
2013/2014 of $72 million) 
Not specified Deliberative community 
panel - 32 randomly 
selected 
85 recommendations 












$100,000 (Total operating 
budget in 2012/2013 of $87.3 
million) 
Workshops 
Online budget allocator 
tool 
Not specified Over 50 projects 
proposed; first 12 funded.  







Capital (all) $68 million (Total capital works 
budget $68 million over 10 
years) 
Various in earlier 
overarching ‘2029 and 
Beyond’ project 
Deliberative community 





prioritisation of 138 











$70 million (Total 
services/operating budget of 
$70million 
Various in earlier 
overarching ‘2029 and 
Beyond’ project 
Deliberative community 












Capital  (New 
community 
infrastructure) 
$2 million  
($1 million per year) (Total 
capital works budget $40.3 
million in 2014/2015) 
Public submissions Deliberative citizen's jury - 
44 randomly selected 
Eight recommendations. 
Unanimously accepted 












$5.9 billion (Total budget of 
$5.9 billion over 10 years) 
Workshops 
Discussion groups 









incorporated into Long 




Sources: City of Canada Bay (2012); City of Canada Bay (2013); City of Canada Bay (2014); Thompson (2012); IAP2 Australasia (2014); City of Melville (2012); City of 
Greater Geraldton (2013); City of Greater Geraldton (2014); City of Darebin (2014b); City of Melbourne (2014). 




Canada Bay, NSW 
Located in Sydney’s inner west, Canada Bay covers an area of approximately 20 square 
kilometres and services a population of over 80,000. Reportedly tired of poor turnout at 
public meetings, in 2012 the Mayor agreed to an alternative approach to engaging the 
community through use of a deliberative panel (Thompson 2012: 4). The panel consisted of 
32 randomly selected demographically representative citizens who met for a total of 45 hours 
across five Saturdays in a three month period. Overseen by a third party organisation and 
independently facilitated, the panel was tasked with determining Council’s service priorities, 
levels and funding for a four year period subject to final approval by Council (City of Canada 
Bay 2014: 38). The panel presented their report to Council in November 2012, which made 
over 80 specific recommendations across all service areas and included a recommendation for 
a rate rise (Thompson and Reidy 2014). One year later, Council received a follow-up report 
that investigated the recommendations not yet implemented as well as options for additional 
savings and income generation. Council has and is responsible for implementing the 
recommendations and the reporting of these was incorporated into the organisation’s 2014 
Annual Report (City of Canada Bay 2014)
2
 (see Table 1). 
Arguably, the Canada Bay PB experience is significant for several reasons. First is the 
use of a representative deliberative panel. While this practice is becoming increasingly 
prevalent, particularly as a mechanism aimed at attempting to solve the ‘wicked problems’ 
that governments face (Weymouth and Hartz-Karp 2015; 2008), deliberative processes are a 
considerable departure from the traditional community engagement practices of most local 
governments such as public meetings and surveys. The benefits of deliberative processes are 
widely espoused (Weymouth and Hartz-Karp 2015) and in Australia they are becoming a 
preferred method for PB. While this is not an unreasonable pairing, consideration must be 




Canada Bay experience is important is its success in increasing local rates. Such a decision 
typically provokes outrage from the community. However, in this instance when the decision 
was made by a group of randomly selected residents it was received as wise and reasonable 
by the wider community (Hartz-Karp 2012: 11) (again, see Table 1 for a comparison across 
categories). 
Melville, WA 
The City of Melville is located in Perth’s south and covers an area of approximately 50 
square kilometres, servicing a population of just over 100,000. In 2012 the Council allocated 
$100,000 for a participatory community grants program that would see the community vote 
on a series of community-initiated projects costing between $1,000 and $20,000. The process 
was led by a youth advisory group that developed the process as well as a marketing and 
communications strategy centred on the Robin Hood theme (IAP2 Australasia 2014). 
Following a series of ‘place-making workshops’ over a two month period designed to assist 
community members in identifying suitable projects to propose, 50 applications proceeded to 
the voting stage. An online budget allocator tool was implemented to allow community 
members to distribute their virtual budget of $100,000 during a two week period in June/July 
2014. A total of 1, 379 community members voted and the first twelve projects were funded. 
The project returned in 2015, albeit it with half the budget (City of Melville 2015). 
Compared to Canada Bay and the other examples following, Melville appears as an 
altogether different type of participatory budgeting process. However, using the basic 
definition provided by (Goldfrank 2007a: 92) where PB is defined as people participating in a 
decision-making process determining how to spend all or part of a government budget, it 
conforms. It bears a much closer resemblance to traditional PB processes where a public vote 




without qualification. While not deliberative, it the only process amongst the examples to be 
repeated, suggesting that it is easier to implement and sustain. 
Geraldton, WA 
The City of Greater Geraldton is the result of an initial amalgamation in 2007 of the City of 
Geraldton and Shire of Greenough and a subsequent amalgamation in 2011 with the Shire of 
Mullewa (Grant et al. 2012). It is located on the coast of Western Australia approximately 
400 kilometres north of Perth, is nearly 13,000 kilometres in area and services a population of 
approximately 40,000 residents. In its short life, the council has built a reputation for regular 
and effective engagement with its community in public decision-making with a focus on 
building a deliberative community centred on collaborative governance (Hartz-Karp 2012; 
Grant et al. 2012). Building on the work of the community strategic plan commenced in 
2009, ‘2029 and Beyond’, in 2013 the Council undertook two consecutive PB processes. The 
first was conducted in late 2013 and consisted of a deliberative community panel of 28 
randomly selected community members to determine the priorities for the 10 Year, $68M 
capital works budget. The panel met for four full days during the month of November 2013 
and concluded by presenting a list of 138 capital works projects prioritised by both 
community and city desirability (City of Greater Geraldton 2013). The second process was 
undertaken in early 2014 with a remit of recommending the desired range, level and priority 
of services for the Council’s $70 million annual services budget. Once again a deliberative 
panel was used, this time comprising 37 people who were briefed in December 2013 and then 
met over seven Saturdays during an eight week period. The group made recommendations 
about which services should be increased, decreased, refocused and those that ought to 
remain the same (City of Greater Geraldton 2014).  
While Geraldton’s PB processes share similarities with those undertaken earlier at 




arguably they have greater significance than just being another example. This resides in the 
larger framework of engagement and governance practiced by the city. The international 
award winning ‘2029 and Beyond’ project piloted a deliberative collaborative governance 
approach that included a central community strategic plan supported by a number of 
interrelated initiatives and plans that were all collaborative with the community (Grant et al. 
2012; Hartz-Karp 2012; Weymouth and Hartz-Karp 2015). Not only has this broader 
approach to a different way of working with the community been more ambitious, it has also 
been successful, with Gollagher and Hartz-Karp (2013: 2353) reporting that the processes 
‘have resulted in plans and actions that are more far-reaching than local decision makers had 
ever envisaged’. The collaborative culture between the Council and its community became so 
assumed that the impetus for the PB processes came as a response to a council decision to 
raise rates with minimal engagement with the community. It is interesting to note that PB was 
identified earlier during the ‘2029 and Beyond’ project but was decided to be too risky at the 
time, as it was determined a higher degree of trust was needed amongst community, staff and 
the organisation for such a process to have the best chance at success (Hartz-Karp 2012). 
Thus far, Geraldton is the only Australian local government to place PB within a larger 
framework of deliberative collaborative governance (Gollagher and Hartz-Karp 2013: 2354). 
Darebin, Victoria 
With a population of over 140,000 people and an area of 53 square kilometres, the City of 
Darebin covers Melbourne’s gentrifying northern suburbs. In 2013/2014 the Council 
introduced a ratepayer-funded infrastructure fund to cover the costs of a new community 
facility with the proviso that the community could decide how the fund would be spent in 
future. Consequently, a citizens’ jury was tasked with determining how to best spend $2 
million on infrastructure over a two year period. A public submission period preceded the 




annual state-wide satisfaction survey and council’s own quarterly community surveys, were 
given to the 44 jury members to be included in their deliberations that were conducted over 
four Saturdays over a four month period. The group was expected to reach consensus on their 
set of recommendations, or if not a supermajority of 80 percent was deemed acceptable. 
Council’s promise to the group was to accept the recommendations on an ‘all or nothing’ 
basis (City of Darebin 2014). The eight recommendations presented to the Mayor in August 
2014 were unanimously accepted by the Council. Two of the eight recommendations had 
come from the earlier public process. 
While Darebin followed suit with the deliberative approach to PB adopted by Canada 
Bay and Geraldton, it was more conservative in scaling down the budget and budget 
timeframe available to the community for decision-making. It can be argued that the process 
conformed more closely to the citizen jury format by encouraging public submissions 
beforehand.  
Melbourne, Victoria 
As noted in our Introduction, Melbourne is Australia’s second largest city, covering an area 
of 36 square kilometres and while it is home to over 100,000 residents, it is estimated that 
around 805,000 people use the city each day and that it hosts over one million international 
visitors each year. The decision to undertake a PB process lay in response to how the city 
could remain liveable while responding to future challenges such as economic uncertainty 
and population growth (Reece 2015). Melbourne’s methodology consisted of both broad 
community engagement followed by a deliberative process. The broad engagement involved 
over 600 people utilising online budget tools, workshops and ‘pop-up’ events; the results of 
which were used to a create a summary report to the ‘people’s panel’. The panel was 
comprised of 43 randomly selected residents, business owners and students who met for six 




promise they would be incorporated into the 10 Year Financial Plan to the maximum extent 
possible. Nine of the 11 recommendations were adopted with one of the recommendations 
covering avenues of advocacy for the Council, mostly directed towards the state government. 
The other, a proposal for a rate increase above CPI, was unable to be responded to due to the 
introduction of rate capping in Victoria by the state government.  
It can be argued that the importance of Melbourne in the evolution of PB in Australia 
resides principally in how it has raised the profile of the PB. As the first capital city to deliver 
a PB process with the largest aggregate budget to be decided to date; also as the process that 
resulted in a recommendation for raise rates, it is reasonable to assume that other Australian 
local governments are looking to this example. The Victorian Local Government Association 
(VLGA) has held workshops on how to run PB following the Melbourne and Darebin 
experiences. This corresponds with the VLGA’s strategic action to ‘expand the understanding 
and uptake of PB by local Councils’ (VLGA 2014). In addition to this increased profile, the 
following processes are underway: South Gippsland in Victoria is allocating $1.6 million for 
infrastructure projects in four towns (South Gippsland Shire Council 2015; Gray 2015); 
Penrith City Council in New South Wales is asking a community panel to help determine 
service and infrastructure levels in 2015/2016 and beyond (Penrith City Council 2015) and 
Kingborough in Tasmania has resolved to consider PB models that may be suitable for them 
(Kingborough Council 2015). 
Critical issues for future PB in Australia 
While the number of PB processes in Australia thus far can be assessed as a modest, the high 
profile of the Melbourne example, along with workshops led by peak bodies and reports of 
PB processes in the pipeline (see, for example, Penrith City Council 2015; South Gippsland 
Shire Council 2015) would suggest that PB will enjoy an increased degree of popularity. This 




“trendy”, it is likely that a growing number of cities will adopt and adapt this methodology’. 
Given the relative novelty of the practice in the Australian context, it is not feasible to 
attempt to tie all the themes together to make a succinct comment on the future directions of 
Australian PB. Instead, we pose a series of questions to consider how PB might develop in 
Australia. 
What is the role of deliberative practices in Australian PBs?  
In the six PB processes discussed above, five of the case studies utilised deliberative methods 
of community panels, or citizens’ juries, where the participants were randomly selected to 
ensure they represented a microcosm of the wider community. The benefits of deliberative 
democracy in participatory budgeting are well documented and researched (Nabatchi 2010, 
Gollagher and Hartz-Karp 2012, Lerner and Secondo 2012, Weymouth and Hartz-Karp 2015) 
including the Geraldton case study by Hartz-Karp (2012). Any PB process requires 
participants to understand information and data which they then utilise to make a decision. 
Deliberative processes are (arguably) well suited to this task as they provide space and time 
for participants to test assumptions, question sources, set criteria and deliberate responses. 
The result of these processes is a well-considered series of recommendations from the group, 
rather than a public vote. The shifts towards deliberative processes rather than popular vote 
illustrate alignment with the contemporary PB principles such as those defined by Wampler 
(2012). 
Despite this, deliberative processes are not without their weaknesses, the greatest of 
which is inclusion (Chambers 2009, Lafont 2015). While in some instances the participants 
of Australian deliberative processes have all been selected to be demographically 
representative (Canada Bay and Melbourne, for example) it is nevertheless difficult to ensure 
they are inclusive of varying views; further, the process is only open to those with an 




Moreover, while most of the Australian examples presented have incorporated wider 
community processes along with their selective deliberative processes, it is no doubt difficult 
to marry to the two together, particularly giving the varying ‘depths’ of the two 
conversations. In addition, deliberative processes require more time than traditional 
engagement methods used by local governments such as surveys, alongside requiring skill 
sets that may not be present in the organisation. Arguably, attempts to overcome the time and 
skill requirements are likely risk failure. 
What is the likely longevity of PB in the Australian context? 
With over 25 years of PB practice globally, one of the salient features is the precariousness of 
PB in some contexts: While in some instances the practice has become embedded in 
institutions and is repeated regularly (see, for example, Hilden, Germany (Sintomer et al, 
2013, p18), Guelph, Canada (Sintomer et al 201, p51)  Chicago, US (Lerner and Secondo, 
2012)) if not annually, in other cities it disappears after a short period (see, for example, 
Montreal, Canada (Sintomer et al 2013, p44), Essen Germany (Sintomer et al 2013, p 50, 
Pieve Emanuele, Italy (Sintomer el al, p 45) ). Perhaps ironically, PB often proves durable 
when the practice is implemented by a central government, such as in Brazil (Cabannes 2004; 
Goldfrank 2012: 11) and when the practice is required as part of a funding agreement with 
agencies such as the World Bank (Goldfrank 2012, p.11). However, in the face of political 
change, the practice is often abandoned, such as in Porto Alegre Brazil where the original 
model proved unsustainable (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2014).  
In their analysis of the fragility and volatility of Portuguese PBs, Alves and Allegretti 
(2012) reported that only one-third of the projects initiated were still in existence and argued 
that PBs are more likely to be sustainable if decision-making power is transferred to citizens 
and is adaptable in shape and scope to address the needs of participants. Many of the 




only one council, Melville, thus far committed to a subsequent process (City of Melville 
2015). 
How ought organisations and leaders adapt for PB? 
The question of how enduring PB processes are hints at a further issue – that of how prepared 
and equipped organisations and their leaders need to be to implement PB processes. 
Arguably, even an uncomplicated straightforward participatory process requires considerable 
resources (time, money and skills) and PBs conform to this, particularly when processes 
include wide-reaching engagement and/or deliberative processes – and we have seen that 
many of the Australian examples have. In addition to these more tangible resources, 
organisations, their leaders and decision-makers need to have a level of understanding and 
capacity about what PB is, what it can achieve and where it sits as an element of democratic 
decision-making processes.  
The question of organisational readiness is one that emerged during the Geraldton 
experience. Hartz-Karp (2012: 5) noted that although PB was initially planned as part of the 
earlier ‘2029 and Beyond’ project, and that ‘it was considered to be too high a risk, especially 
since there was distrust between the community and administration, and elected officials 
were very wary’. Limited support from employees within the organisation has also been 
identified as a key risk in delivering PB, with instances of staff becoming oppositional to 
community decisions and slowing down the process reported (Pinnington, Lerner and 
Schugurensky 2009: 476). Without a willingness and capacity to provide information and 
relinquish decision making, PB processes may risk failure. 
Impact of PB upon the roles and responsibilities of local and state government 
PB in Australia has focused on governance and the distribution of basic services, in particular 
those associated with capital works. This has resulted in participants of Australian PBs 




local government. Examples include: transport infrastructure (City of Darebin 2014; City of 
Melbourne 2014), changes to planning legislation (Canada Bay Citizens’ Panel 2012; City of 
Melbourne 2014), provision of schools (City of Melbourne 2014), calls for higher developer 
contributions (Canada Bay Citizens’ Panel 2012; City of Melbourne 2014) and provision of 
community services (City of Melbourne 2014).  In response to these calls, councils usually 
offer to take an advocacy role to facilitate change in these areas.  
Of particular interest is that in the cases of Canada Bay and Melbourne, both groups 
achieved consensus that it was necessary to raise council rates (Canada Bay Citizens’ Panel 
2012; City of Melbourne 2014). As we have already emphasised, in the case of Melbourne, 
this recommendation contradicted the recently introduced rate-capping policy of the new 
state government and was therefore unable to be implemented.  
There are three significant considerations arising from these ‘out of scope’ requests. 
The first relates to the integrity of the process: If participants cannot have an influence where 
they desire, they are likely to become frustrated and not participate and should engagement 
continue, it is likely to be viewed as tokenistic. The second relates to the relationships local 
governments have with their respective state governments and in some cases, the federal 
government. In a climate of constant reforms and amalgamations, many of which are 
acrimonious in nature (see, for example, Ryan et al. 2015: 3-5) it is conceivable that local 
governments will pay a price for advocacy. Third, the recommendations to raise rates by 
Canada Bay and Melbourne were accepted by their respective wider communities. Advocates 
of deliberative methods champion this as an example of how communities place higher trust 
in groups other than representatives they have elected. However, there is a risk that elected 
representatives will interpret these outcomes as a way to raise to raise rates without voter 





What should be the roles of various actors and who decides? 
The variation in PBs across Australia means that the roles and responsibilities of the actors 
involved have also varied. The role of participants in the Australian example has typically 
been to make recommendations to the elected representatives. Design and facilitation of the 
process and recruitment of participants is usually coordinated by the organisation and 
implementation rests with the organisation. To a degree, these differences are reflective of the 
different legislative landscapes across Australian local government jurisdictions (see, for 
example, Grant et al. 2011). Notable is that in five of the six Australian examples discussed 
here a third party intermediary was engaged to either design, facilitate, recruit or oversee the 
process or a combination of these (see Table 1). The third party ensures a public commitment 
from the council that recommendations are adopted where possible. While the use of third 
parties might be promoted as a means to ensure impartiality and ensure trust, it begs the 
wider issue of why local administrations are less trusted and where guardianship for 
democracy lies. 
How does the design of Australian PBs demonstrate democratic values? 
At one level, namely what in the discussion above we have denoted as the debate confined to 
the right quadrant of Figure 1, the issue of whether PB fosters democracy can be partly 
answered through the application of frameworks such as Fung’s ‘democracy cube’ (2006, 
2015): Thus, the first variable, i.e.: ‘who participates’ varies in Australian practice, with the 
deliberative processes utilising random selection and the Melville example open to the wider 
public making them more inclusive on the spectrum of participant selection. On the variable 
of ‘communication and decision making’, the deliberative methods use more intense modes 
whereas the Melville example demonstrated a less intense mode where participants are 
invited to develop, and then express preferences. When measured against the third variable of 




and consult rather than have direct authority, the degree of influence available is limited, in 
most instances by the legislation.  The value of Fung’s (2006) ‘democracy cube’ is that it 
provides a reference point for considering how the design of participatory processes such as 
PB can facilitate the democratic values of legitimacy, effective governance and justice. 
However, in the discussion above we have deliberately cast the net broadly, choosing to 
view PB as a component of local democratic practices generally. In this regard it is possible 
to view it as a high-profile compliment to other arrangements – those for ‘user-pays’, 
‘networked’ and (in particular) representative arrangements. Yet to do so is complacent for 
two reasons. The first is that representative arrangements in the local government systems in 
Australia are highly variable. For instance, voting is not compulsory in local government 
elections in Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania (Tan and Grant 2013: 65-66) 
and participation rates in these jurisdictions at the most recent local government elections 
were 27.76%, 31.99% and 54.58% respectively (ECSA 2014; TEC 2014; WAEC 2014). As 
such the robustness of representation ought not to be taken for granted. This entails, second, 
that to assume that more PB equates to more democracy is misleading, despite the salience of 
the literature that both theorises and advocates the elements of the ‘participatory’ quadrant in 
Figure 1 and the critique and problematisation of representation mentioned above (see also 
Dollery and Grant 2010). In short, PB only enhances democracy if the other elements are in 
place. 
Conclusion 
The democratic values of effective governance, legitimacy and justice, as identified by Fung 
(2006, 2015) serve as useful points of reflection upon the critical issues identified above. If 
the incidence of PB continues to increase in Australian local governments, the opportunity 
exists to enhance these values. Australian PB has been able to demonstrate effective 




processes. By providing the space for people to question, consider and reach consensus, the 
outcomes are more likely to be robust and sustainable. Legitimacy is being contributed to by 
the inclusion of community members in the creation of the budget with the willingness to 
support decisions, such as increasing rates, enhanced by the use of everyday citizens. 
Arguably as well, justice (see, in particular, Fung 2006) is being enhanced by ensuring 
equitable access to the opportunity to be involved in the process.  
Despite these encouraging indicators, the values are at risk of being misinterpreted as 
processes are designed. Three indicators of this can be identified. First, the proportion of 
budget available is crucial (see Table 1 for a comparison). If small, there is a risk a PB will be 
seen as tokenistic. Second, the authority available to participants to make a decision. Merely 
making recommendations rather than decisions may also result in a PB being seen as 
tokenistic. In this sense, the terms of engagement are weighted heavily in favour of traditional 
arrangements (Head 2007). Third is the issue of inclusivity. While demographically 
representative groups give Australian local governments a good indicator of the wider 
sentiment, they may also exclude people who may wish to participate. Nevertheless, we think 
it is reasonable to assume that more local government administrators will seek to test the 
waters of PB and developments so far indicate that the ‘adopting and adapting’ (Wampler and 
Hartz-Karp 2012: 12) is likely to continue. 
Endnotes: 
1. The People’s Panel recommendation to increase rates was the first of the 11 recommendations. It read: 
‘the People’s Panel 2014 acknowledges that rate rises are required in order to meet both operating and 
capital budget requirements. The Panel recommends that rates be increased by CPI plus up to 2.5% pa 
for the next 10 years.’ (City of Melbourne 2015: 6). The other recommendations concerned (2) issues 
of environmental sustainability; (3) marketing the City; (4) the selling of non-core assets; (5) the 
redevelopment of Queen Victoria Market; (6) an endorsement of debt finance for growth infrastructure 




strong advocacy role, inclusive of greater control of developer contributions; (9) the maintenance of 
community services at current standards; (10) the targeting of a one percent efficiency dividend in 
operating costs and (11) a reduction in capital works spending of 10 per cent over the 10-year budget 
period (City of Melbourne 2015). 
 
2. Canada Bay Council was unable to implement some recommendations due to legislative constraints; 
for example the recommendation to increase Developer Contributions levies, which are capped by the 
State Government (City of Canada Bay 2013: 198). 
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